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This is the preprint of an article whose final and 
 definitive form is forthcoming in Dialectica 
Categorical Norms and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse 
Abstract 
Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-
realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-
relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I 
give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a 
distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that 
convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is 
not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. I then argue that Hazlett's account of a 
controversial upshot of convention-relativism - namely, that epistemic discourse is not 
"normative" - should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic 
norms are categorical. This leads to a more general discussion of anti-realism in 
epistemology.  
 
1. Introduction 
Allan Hazlett (2013; 2014) has recently developed an alternative to the most 
popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He 
calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view draws on Ernie 
Sosa’s “insulated critical domains” (Sosa 2007). Hazlett combines Sosa’s framework 
with a view about the conventional nature of epistemology’s “central organizing value” 
and draws some controversial meta-epistemological implications. To my knowledge, it is 
the only existing attempt at aligning Sosa’s framework with an explicitly anti-realist 
meta-epistemological stance. I think the view deserves more attention. Here I give it 
attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction 
between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-
relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent 
with categorical epistemic norms. I then argue that Hazlett's account of a controversial 
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upshot of convention-relativism - namely, that epistemic discourse is not "normative" - 
should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic norms are 
categorical. Doing so requires assessing the anti-realist options on this score. In 
particular, if Hazlett’s main anti-realist competitor, epistemic expressivism, can embrace 
categorical epistemic norms without incurring the disadvantages Hazlett claims it does, 
then it looks like we can embrace a very natural way of thinking about epistemic 
discourse while remaining anti-realist. I argue that this is the case, and that, for this 
reason, more needs to be said about why convention-relativism is an attractive anti-realist 
alternative.  
2. Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse 
The view’s core is Sosa’s notion of insulated critical domains. To illustrate, recall 
Sosa’s coffee analogy (Sosa 2007). The basic idea is that evaluations concerning a wide 
range of items having to do with coffee drinking – coffee bean fields, coffee machines, 
coffee mugs – are organized by or derivative from a central value, namely “the value of 
liquid coffee that is delicious and aromatic” (Sosa 2007, p.73). When I evaluate a coffee 
machine as a good coffee machine, I evaluate it as good relative to the central organizing 
value of delicious aromatic liquid coffee. Evaluations that are organized by or derivative 
from this central value comprise the critical domain of coffee drinking. Sosa’s idea is that 
epistemology is a domain of this kind. According to Sosa, epistemology is organized 
around the central value of true belief. Positive or negative evaluations of, for example, a 
belief-forming process, an argument, or a person’s method of inquiry are organized by or 
derivative from the central value of true belief. These evaluations comprise the critical 
domain of epistemology (“the epistemic domain”).  
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To call a critical domain “insulated” is to claim that the central organizing value 
need not be valued or valuable in order to structure evaluation within the critical domain. 
For example, on this model, I can truly and sincerely claim that a coffee machine is a 
“good” coffee machine without this requiring that I value liquid coffee, and without this 
requiring that liquid coffee is intrinsically valuable. The central organizing value of 
delicious and aromatic liquid coffee need not be “domain transcendent”. It simply has to 
make sense of evaluations within the critical domain, from a structural or explanatory 
point of view. 
When it comes to epistemology, the basic point is that the question of the 
structure and nature of epistemic evaluation can be seen as orthogonal to the question of 
the value of true belief. As Sosa puts it: 
Our present worry abstracts from such Platonic issues of epistemic normativity. 
Truth may or may not be intrinsically valuable absolutely, who knows? Our 
worry requires only that we consider truth the epistemically fundamental value 
(Sosa 2007, p.72).  
Regardless of whether it is intrinsically valuable (i.e. domain-transcendently valuable) 
true belief structures, or organizes our evaluations in the epistemic domain.1 Again, it 
makes sense of them, from a structural or explanatory point of view. This of course raises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 What is the motivation for remaining agnostic on the intrinsic value of true belief? For one thing, cases of 
trivial truths cast doubt on the idea. Meanwhile, adjusting one’s theory of the value of true belief such that 
cases of trivial truths are not valuable can threaten the scope of epistemic normativity, depending on how 
one understands the nature of epistemic normativity. A central motivation for Sosa’s insulated critical 
domains is that it provides satisfactory scope for epistemic normativity without claiming that trivial truths 
are intrinsically valuable (see Grimm 2009).  
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a question. If not its intrinsic value, what else explains true belief’s status as the central 
organizing value of the epistemic domain?  
Hazlett’s answer to this question is “convention”. That is to say, “what makes one 
thing, rather than another, the central organizing value of the critical domain of the 
epistemic is a matter of what we mean by ‘epistemic’” (Hazlett 2014, p.231). According 
to Hazlett, “epistemic” is term of art. It is philosophers’ jargon (contrast “moral” or 
“aesthetic”).2 Thus, figuring out what “we” mean by “epistemic” is a matter of best 
capturing or systematizing the practices of the relevant theorists – i.e. the ones who use 
the term “epistemic” (Hazlett 2013, Ch.9.3; 2014, p.231). In contrast with Sosa, Hazlett 
claims this job is best done by the notion of accuracy – a more general sort of value, of 
which true belief is a paradigm case. But that is unimportant for present purposes.  
Convention-relativism about epistemic discourse, then, is the view that our 
epistemic evaluations (thought and talk) are true relative to a non-domain-transcendent 
central organizing value – namely, the value of accuracy. That this is the case is 
determined by the conventional facts about what the relevant theorists mean by 
“epistemic”. Commitment to the “insulated” nature of critical domains – and seeing the 
epistemic as just one more of these – is what makes convention-relativism consistent with 
anti-realism about epistemic normativity: “Critical domains are ‘insulated’ and free from 
commitment to the ‘real’ existence of the relevant values. To say that true belief [or, 
more generally, accuracy] is epistemically valuable is not to say anything about the worth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Hazlett provides interesting evidence for this claim from the Oxford English Dictionary (Hazlett 2014, p. 
231).  
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of the central organizing value of the critical domain of the epistemic…” (2014, p.234; 
see also 2013, Ch. 9.2.3).3  
The view differs from expressivism in the following key way. Very roughly, 
according to a prominent version of expressivism, a positive epistemic evaluation (such 
as “S is justified in believing that p”) is to be understood as expressing a complex mental 
state consisting of i) a belief that S’s belief that p conforms to some set of standards, and 
ii) a non-representational attitude of acceptance towards those standards.4 It is a complex 
issue how exactly to understand the idea of an attitude of acceptance in this context.5 
However we spell out the details, the main point is that it plays a non-representational 
organizing role vis-à-vis our beliefs or credences. I will return to this issue below.  
Hazlett claims that convention-relativism differs with respect to the second part of 
the expressivist’s semantic set-up. The way he puts the point, an agent can positively 
epistemically evaluate a belief, an argument, or someone’s method of inquiry, without 
thereby valuing (expressing any attitude of acceptance towards) the central organizing 
value of the critical domain of the epistemic. While an agent may express a positive or 
negative non-representational attitude concerning the central organizing value of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Convention-relativism likens the epistemic domain to the rules of a club. The rules of etiquette in the club 
may be structured around a central organizing value without that thereby implying anything about its worth 
or value. As I note below, this is not a necessary condition on being consistent with anti-realism. 
Expressivism is consistent with anti-realism for different reasons.  
4 This is roughly Chrisman (2007). Other prominent epistemic expressivists include Ridge (2007) and 
Gibbard (2003). Some of them frame the view in importantly different ways. These differences need not 
concern us for present purposes.  
5	  Hazlett seems comfortable equating it with endorsement and approval. As I argue below, I think this is 
problematic.	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epistemic domain, such expressions are not built in to the semantics of epistemic 
discourse.6 As we will see below, Hazlett takes this to be the main advantage of 
convention-relativism over expressivism.  
In sum, the view is an alternative to the most prominent form of meta-
epistemological anti-realism. It draws on Sosa’s insulated critical domains, one of the 
prominent views in normative epistemology. These features, among others, make it an 
interesting view that deserves discussion. But convention-relativism has some 
controversial consequences. As I argue below, it is not clear that Hazlett has the resources 
to successfully handle them.  
2. Binding Nature of Epistemic Evaluation 
Epistemologists often speak of the “binding” nature of epistemic evaluation 
(Berker 2013; Grimm 2009; Kelly 2003). When we assess someone’s belief as 
ungrounded, for example, we in some sense call upon that person to change what they 
believe, or perhaps to respond with grounds. Moreover, according to many 
epistemologists, this seems true in a “non-optional” way (Grimm 2009). That is, 
regardless of whether the person with the ungrounded belief wants to or not (or has any 
interest whatsoever in what we are after), we still think it is incumbent upon them change 
their belief (or the situation).  
Convention-relativism seems to be at odds with this picture. After all, in 
grounding the critical domain of epistemology in convention, Hazlett explicitly likens 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 That the speaker need not endorse the central organizing value in making epistemic evaluations also 
distinguishes convention-relativism from what Boghossian (2006) calls “epistemic relativism”. 
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epistemic norms to the rules of the “Plantation Club”. One of the rules of the Plantation 
Club is that you must only eat peas with a spoon. Surely there is nothing non-optional 
about obeying such a rule. However, Hazlett draws a distinction that looks relevant here. 
He distinguishes between “inescapable” and “instrumental” norms. Roughly, inescapable 
norms apply to you regardless of your goals or desires. Meanwhile, instrumental norms 
are contingent on your goals or desires. He claims that convention-relativism “is 
consistent with, and can explain, the fact that epistemic normativity is inescapable, in 
Philippa Foot’s (1972) sense…” (p.234). And indeed, we can see this simply by looking 
at what has been explained above. Namely we have seen that a critical domain’s central 
organizing value can do the work of structuring and explaining evaluations in that 
domain without being valued by anyone. This is arguably another way of saying, for 
example, that a person (or their beliefs) can be evaluated within the critical domain of 
epistemology regardless of whether they care about having true beliefs. I agree that 
convention-relativism is consistent with the inescapability of epistemic normativity.  
However, we need to draw a further distinction in order to get clear on what 
epistemologists often mean by “non-optional” or “binding”. We need to contrast 
“inescapability” with a further, stronger, notion of “categoricity”.  
• Inescapability: a norm N is inescapable if and only if it applies to you, regardless 
of your aims or desires.  
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• Categoricity: a norm N is categorical if and only if it gives you a reason to Φ, 
regardless of your aims or desires.7  
What does it mean for a norm to give you a reason to Φ? First of all, I should emphasize 
that I have what are often called normative reasons in mind, as opposed to motivating, or 
explanatory reasons. I should also emphasize that, to make my point, I need merely have 
pro tanto reasons in mind. I see no reason to think categorical norms necessarily give you 
something more than a pro tanto reason to Φ. A widely endorsed view is that pro tanto 
normative reasons are considerations that speak in favour of Φ-ing (Sylvan forthcoming). 
8 9 To put things somewhat differently, then, we can say: if a categorical norm prescribes 
Φ-ing, this is a consideration (or, rather, this entails that there are considerations) that 
speak(s) in favour of Φ-ing, regardless of your aims or desires. Meanwhile, if an 
inescapable norm prescribes Φ-ing, this need not speak in favour of Φ-ing, regardless of 
your aims or desires. Inescapable norms merely apply to you, regardless of your aims or 
desires. To see that a norm can apply to you and yet fail to give you a reason to do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This way of drawing the distinction is due to Hazlett (personal communication).  
8 When it comes to normative reasons, there is a widely recognized distinction between reasons there are 
(“objective reasons”) and reasons one has (“subjective reasons”). Consider the classic gin and petrol case. 
When a crazed bartender serves you a glass of petrol (which is for the moment indistinguishable from gin), 
there is a conclusive reason not to drink what’s in the glass; but since you cannot tell the difference, the fact 
there is petrol in the glass is not a reason you have not to drink what’s in the glass. That reason is not yet 
possessed by you. Whether subjective reasons are just a subspecies of objective reasons (the possessed 
ones), and exactly what reason-possession amounts to, are questions I do not need to get into here. Whether 
we understand categorical norms in terms of reasons there are or reasons one has does not affect the 
usefulness of my schema in highlighting the difference between categorical and inescapable norms.  
9 There is also a debate about the ontology of normative reasons. Some think normative reasons are mental 
states; some think they are facts or apparent facts (usually about the world); still others think they are 
propositions. I wish to remain neutral on this debate. See (Sylvan forthcoming) for helpful discussion.   
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anything, consider the Plantation Club’s pea and spoon rule: whether or not it applies to 
you is not a matter of your aims or desires. But it is not categorical: despite applying to 
you, it need not give you a reason (even a pro tanto one) to do anything independently of 
your aims or desires. 
Convention-relativism is incompatible with categorical epistemic norms. Again, 
this is because it grounds the critical domain of epistemology in convention. There are 
countless examples of conventions which – while they may generate inescapable norms – 
do not give you a pro tanto normative reason to do anything, independently of your aims 
or desires. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, consider these conventions as a case in 
point: 
• Standing ovations at outstanding classical music concerts. 
• Kissing one another on the cheek three times as a mark of formality, birthdays, 
or the return from a long absence.  
• “Liking” photos of your friends on Facebook.  
More than this, it is implausible that mere conventions ever generate norms that give you 
a pro tanto normative reason to do anything, independently of your aims or desires. For 
one thing, conventional norms are a helpful contrast to categorical norms. But more 
importantly, whatever the conditions on conventionhood (see e.g. Lewis 1969), it does 
not follow from the mere fact that a large group of people Φ—in a way that meets the 
relevant conditions on conventionhood—that one has a pro tanto normative reason to Φ, 
independently of one’s aims or desires. Therefore, because convention-relativism 
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grounds the critical domain of epistemology in convention, it is incompatible with 
categorical epistemic norms.  
3. Reverse Open Question Argument 
Hazlett acknowledges that an important upshot of convention-relativism is that 
epistemic discourse is “not normative”. And he grants that this is of course controversial. 
He seeks to defend his view by arguing that epistemic discourse is indeed not normative, 
despite seeming normative. He also provides an explanation as to why it seems 
normative. I focus here on his argument that epistemic discourse is not normative. Since 
worries about bindingness got us concerned about the view in the first place, we need to 
investigate whether Hazlett’s argument accounts for such worries.   
He calls it the “reverse open question argument”. The idea is that if we can 
coherently ask a question such as “S epistemically ought to believe that p, but ought S 
really believe that p?”, then “epistemically ought” is not normative. The same goes for 
epistemic uses of  “good” and  “virtuous” (Hazlett 2013, Ch. 9.2.3; 2014, p.238). Hazlett 
claims that we can coherently ask such questions: 
We might put our point this way: we can coherently question the normative 
force of epistemic value (or of epistemic rules or norms). ‘Epistemically good’ 
and ‘epistemically ought’ are different from words like ‘good’ and ‘ought’, sans 
qualification. There is an obvious sense in which it is incoherent to ask whether 
the good really is good, or whether one really ought to do what one ought to do. 
This provides at least one sense in which good-talk and ought-talk is normative. 
But this doesn’t apply, mutatis mutandis, to epistemic discourse” (p.239).  
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This is suggestive. But it is not entirely clear how to understand the putatively open 
question. To my mind, the most natural idea here is that we can grant that someone 
epistemically ought to believe that p, and then coherently ask whether it is the case that 
they ought, all-things-considered, to believe that p. But Hazlett denies this: “I do not just 
mean that the epistemic ‘ought’ is not the all-things-considered ‘ought.’ I mean that, even 
granting that S epistemically (but not all-things-considered) ought to Φ, it is coherent to 
ask whether S really ought to Φ, i.e. whether S is really under any kind of obligation to 
Φ” (2013; p.261). But Hazlett needs to be careful here. After all, in considering a 
situation in which one epistemically ought to Φ, Hazlett automatically grants that one 
ought to believe that p in at least one way—i.e. the epistemic way! So it does of course 
seem incoherent to go on to ask whether S ought to Φ in any kind of way (or as Hazlett 
puts it, to be under “any kind of obligation to Φ”). Indeed, it seems that all the action 
surrounds what “really” means in the putatively open question. Hazlett should be 
understood as differentiating the epistemic “ought” from the real “ought”, and asking the 
open question as such. But the notion of the real ought is still unacceptably vague and 
obscure. We need to be more precise if judgments about coherence are to be taken 
seriously.10   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 One issue here, which I will simply set to one side, is that it seems the more clearly we spell out the 
putatively open question, the very idea of drawing conclusions on the basis of a coherence test begins to 
lose cogency. This is because, as will become clear, we seem forced to spell out the putatively open 
question with rather technical terms (like “pro tanto”, and “deliberative”), and it’s not clear what we are 
entitled to infer from our intuitions about the coherence of questions involving such technical terms. For 
one thing, we might wonder about the status of the intuitions themselves. Insofar as we understand the 
relevant question, it seems any intuitions about coherence will be tainted by theoretical leanings, for 
example.  
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On one interpretation, the idea is that we can grant that someone epistemically 
ought to believe that p, and then coherently ask whether it is the case that they ought, in 
the sense of having a pro tanto normative reason, to believe that p.11 Here we have 
something like the normativity at play in my notion of categorical norms in mind. If this 
is plausible, then the open question certainly does seem to raise an issue about the 
normativity of the epistemic “ought”. However, if it is plausible, this is at least partly 
because the question remains too vague. In particular, we need to specify whether the pro 
tanto “ought” (or, if you like, the pro tanto normative reason) at issue is epistemic, or 
moral, or aesthetic, or what. And that will lead to problems. On one hand, if the question 
employs an epistemic pro tanto “ought”, then it again seems false that the question is 
coherent after all. Consider: 
• “Sure, I epistemically ought to Φ, but ought I, in the sense of having a pro 
tanto epistemic reason, to Φ?” 
On the other hand, if the question employs a moral, or aesthetic “ought”, then the 
question simply seems irrelevant to the issue of the normativity of the epistemic “ought”. 
Consider: 
• “Sure, I epistemically ought to Φ, but ought I, in the sense of having a pro 
tanto moral reason, to Φ?” 
Surely claims about the normativity of the epistemic “ought” cannot rest on the fact that 
one can coherently pose this question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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How else to distinguish the epistemic “ought” from the real “ought” in Hazlett’s 
putatively open question? The most plausible remaining option seems to me very close to 
the natural one we started out with. The idea would be that we can grant that someone 
epistemically ought to believe that p, and then coherently ask whether it is the case that 
they ought, in some overarching deliberative sense, to believe that p.12 This is indeed 
very close to framing the question in terms of an all-things-considered “ought”, which 
we’ve seen Hazlett explicitly denies doing. But it is importantly different. Let me briefly 
explain.  
As I see things, the all-things-considered “ought” has two importantly different 
dimensions, or axes. On one hand, the all-things-considered “ought” contrasts with pro 
tanto “ought”s. But on another, it contrasts with “ought”s of a specific domain, such as 
the moral, aesthetic, or epistemic domain. This is to be expected, given that the all-things-
considered “ought” settles the question of what one ought to do once all “ought”s have 
properly been taken into consideration. But put differently, then, the all-things-considered 
“ought” is also simply the last thing we could mean when asking whether one “really” 
ought to do something, or whether they ought do something in any way. After all, I have 
just explained the problem of filling out the putative open question with epistemic, or 
moral “ought”s. In this latter sense, then, the overarching deliberative “ought” and the all-
things-considered “ought” are one and the same thing. 
So, Hazlett seems committed to claiming that epistemic discourse is not 
normative because it does not settle, or even really contribute to, the question of what one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Schroeder (2011), Wedgwood (2006), and Williams (1981) all use the term “deliberative ought”.  
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ought to do (in some broad enough sense of “do” that includes belief formation). 
Understood in this way, the putatively open question does seem coherent, relatively clear, 
and thereby to raise an issue about the normativity of the epistemic “ought”. While I 
think Hazlett is right that epistemic discourse is not normative in this way, I want to 
argue that the reverse open question argument nevertheless fails to adequately address the 
issue of the seemingly binding nature of epistemic evaluation.  
To see why, we simply need to emphasize that overarching deliberative “ought”s 
and categorical “oughts” are not one and the same thing. We can do this in the following 
way. Consider two actions which, for the sake of argument, we will assume one 
categorically ought to do, but which conflict. For example: 
Sandra believes she ought to give part of her salary to charity. She also believes 
she ought to save for her daughter’s education. She doesn’t have much extra cash. 
Ought she give part of her salary to charity? Ought she save for her daughter’s 
education?  
This scenario is consistent with the possibility of a further normative question. Namely, 
there is a question here about what she, in some overarching deliberative sense, ought to 
do. While normative dilemmas may be possible, in such a scenario it seems clear that 
there can be one thing Sandra really ought to do—whatever it is, perhaps it will be a 
function of weighing up these opposing categorical normative considerations. Notice, 
then, in light of this, we can see that categorical “ought”s and overarching deliberative 
“ought”s are different beasts. There could not be two instances of the first type of 
“ought”, and only one of the second, if these were identical “ought”s. Note that the 
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assumption that these “ought”s are categorical is not unfair in this context. This is 
because this assumption is only needed to point out that categorical “ought”s—whether 
there really are true categorical “ought”s, or not—and overarching deliberative “ought”s 
are not one and the same thing. The example is not intended as any kind of argument for 
the existence of categoricity. So, it is fair to assume, hypothetically, that the “ought”s in 
this example are categorical.  To be sure, it may be the case that some over-arching 
deliberative “ought”s are also categorical; but the example serves my purposes so long as 
it highlights that being a categorical “ought” is not sufficient for being an overarching 
deliberative “ought”.  
For this reason, the reverse open question argument does not really speak to the 
issue of the seemingly binding nature of epistemic evaluation. Rather, it shows us that 
epistemic evaluation is not normative in a way that opponents of convention-relativism 
will be likely to agree with. So, I think Hazlett’s reverse open question argument 
ultimately falls short as a defense of convention-relativism vis-à-vis one of convention-
relativism’s controversial upshots.13 Moreover, as we’ve seen, Hazlett’s distinction 
between inescapable and instrumental norms also fails to speak to the issue of the 
seemingly binding nature of epistemic evaluation. This leaves us with an important 
question. Why think, more precisely, that categoricity is something Hazlett should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The reverse open question argument seems to imply that even moral discourse isn’t normative. For 
example, it seems coherent to ask, "I morally ought to give everything I own to charity, but ought I give 
everything I own to charity?”. One might think this alone is a serious problem for the reverse open question 
argument, in the sense that the argument overgeneralizes. But I wish to remain neutral on this question. For 
one thing, I don’t want to get into a debate about whether utterances in the moral case are incoherent. But 
also, it seems likely to me that Hazlett would simply be prepared to accept that his argument generalizes in 
this way. Thanks to [removed], [removed], and an anonymous referee for suggestions here. 
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able to explain away or account for in the first place? Why think epistemic evaluation is 
categorical? This is a big question. Considering it in detail would make this a different 
sort of paper. That said, there are a few significant enough points I can make without 
having to settle that question. 
4. Anti-Realist Options  
First, regardless of whether it is true that epistemic evaluation is categorical, it is a 
prominent view in contemporary epistemology. Indeed, it is arguably the most natural 
starting point.14 That is precisely why recent attempts at casting epistemic normativity in 
instrumentalist terms are interesting and surprising.15 They would not seem interesting 
and surprising if they did not conflict with, or stand in some kind of tension with, a 
natural starting point. Rather, we’d just think they were obviously true. This generates a 
dialectical burden on a view that rejects categoricity. That is to say, rejecting categoricity 
is not a non-controversial option that can simply be assumed in one’s theory. 
Second, and more importantly, Hazlett’s main anti-realist competitor, epistemic 
expressivism, is consistent with categorical norms. Expressivism and convention-
relativism are both views about epistemic discourse. They are meta-epistemological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Kelly (2003) brings this out nicely. He uses cases in which it is clear that an agent epistemically ought to 
believe that p, but in which the agent has no aim or desire to believe truly that p (in one case, the agent has 
an aim or desire not to believe truly that p). Of course, the cases raise issues about how exactly to 
understand epistemic instrumentalism. For example, is it a view about the relationship between epistemic 
normativity and the aims or desires of agents, or is it a view about the relationship between epistemic 
normativity and the aim (or perhaps function) of the mental state of belief? This is a controversial and 
complex issue. I do not need to get into here. I simply note that responding to Kelly’s straightforward 
objection would seem to require entering into this complex debate. 
15 A widely cited attempt is Steglich-Petersen (2011).  
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views. But the way in which each of these meta-epistemological views is consistent with 
anti-realism is different. Expressivism is silent on the nature of the norms or standards 
agents express beliefs about when they utter sentences such as “S is justified in believing 
that p”. Given how I have articulated categorical norms, if some epistemic norm EN is 
categorical, this amounts to the claim that: 
 EN gives you a reason to Φ, regardless of your aims or desires.  
This is a substantive epistemic claim. Epistemic expressivism only makes descriptive 
claims about what it is in virtue of which this sentence means what it does. That is to say, 
as a theory about the meaning of epistemic discourse, it is not committed one way or the 
other to substantive epistemic claims.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Compare the widely discussed issue of whether moral expressivism entails that morality is in some sense 
mind-dependent. Blackburn (1993) notably responds to this worry in roughly the following way. First, he 
claims that it is helpful to frame the question of whether a particular theory is committed to the mind-
dependence of morality in terms of whether or not the theory is committed to counterfactuals of the 
following form (where ‘X’ stands for an object of evaluation and ‘M’ for a moral predicate):  
 
 i) If we had thought that x is M, then x would have been M. 
 ii) If we had not thought that x is M, then x would not have been M.  
 
Once we have framed the question of mind-dependence in terms of whether a theory is committed to i) or 
ii), then we can ask, first, whether i) and ii) are moral sentences or meta-ethical (and thus descriptive) 
sentences. If the former, then, as Blackburn argues, expressivism is not committed to anything one way or 
the other, since it is not in the business of making moral statements; rather, it is in the business of making 
descriptive statements about our moral thought and talk. If the latter, then objections concerning 
expressivism’s supposed commitment to the mind-dependence of morality arguably falter for other reasons. 
For example, as Köhler (2014) and Schroeder (2014) have pointed out, it is difficult to level this objection 
without saddling the expressivist with commitments the expressivist herself rejects. Detailed discussion 
would take us too far afield.  
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 Meanwhile convention-relativism is not silent on the nature of epistemic norms 
or standards. Recall, convention-relativism differs with respect to the second part of 
expressivism’s semantic set-up. Again, according to convention-relativism, an agent can 
positively epistemically evaluate a belief, an argument, or someone’s method of inquiry, 
without thereby valuing (expressing an attitude of acceptance towards) the central 
organizing value of the critical domain of the epistemic. This is plausible precisely 
insofar as the central organizing value of epistemology is merely conventional. So, 
convention-relativism is committed to the further point that the types of standards at play 
are conventional. According to Hazlett, this latter feature is what makes convention-
relativism about epistemic discourse consistent with anti-realism.   
Of course, Hazlett thinks that the expressivist’s commitment to building an 
attitude of acceptance into the semantics of epistemic discourse is a liability for 
expressivism. He seems to think it is a liability insofar as it commits the epistemic 
expressivist to the idea that epistemic discourse is normative in a way that he has argued 
it is not—namely, in the overarching deliberative sense. But—to return to the issue I 
flagged when introducing expressivism above—it is far from clear that this is the case. In 
particular, there are importantly different attitudes of acceptance available to the 
expressivist, and according to what strikes me as a more prominent—and plausible—
approach, the expressivist is not committed to a view about the normativity of epistemic 
discourse that Hazlett thinks we should reject. Let me explain.  
Many expressivists take a cue from Edward Craig’s story about the point or 
function of epistemic concepts like justification and knowledge within an information-
gathering and -distributing economy such as ours (see Chrisman 2007, p.251; Chrisman 
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2012, p.2; Gibbard 2003, Ch.11). On Craig’s account, very roughly, when we say that 
someone knows that p, we “flag” that person as a “reliable informant” (Craig 1990, p.11-
17). In line with this, expressivists often cash out the relevant notion of norm acceptance 
in their semantics for epistemic evaluation in the following sort of way. They claim that 
utterances of the form “S knows that p”, or “S is justified in believing that p”, mean what 
they do in part by expressing some kind of non-representational attitude that is partially 
constituted by the utterer’s disposition to rely on p’s being the case in future deliberation. 
I think this suggests an important distinction between two types of norm acceptance. To 
put it one way, on one hand, we can talk about a kind of engaged acceptance, where this 
is linked to motivation and may indeed imply that the agent values the relevant norms or 
standards (in the way that Hazlett seems to assume norm acceptance entails). But on the 
other hand, we can talk about pragmatic acceptance, where this is merely linked to an 
agent’s plans regarding future deliberation. This strikes me as a less engaged sort of 
acceptance. In particular it does not seem necessary, or even plausible, to characterize 
this sort of acceptance in terms of an agent valuing a set of standards (or states that the 
relevant standards govern). Does this point about the attitude of pragmatic acceptance 
imply that epistemic judgment is merely a kind of pragmatic judgment?17 I don’t think 
so. Recall that, according to the expressivist, utterances such as  “S knows that p” also 
mean what they do in virtue of expressing the agent’s belief that S complies with a 
certain set of epistemic standards. The cognitive component of the expressivist’s 
semantics can thus help demarcate epistemic discourse as distinctively epistemic, even 
when the non-cognitive component is understood along the lines of an attitude of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this point.   
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pragmatic acceptance. Nevertheless, the mere fact that an agent is disposed to rely on 
something’s being the case says nothing about whether or not the agent values anything 
in a way Hazlett would find problematic.  
Importantly, this way of cashing out the relevant attitude of acceptance does not 
seem to be in conflict with Hazlett’s reverse open question argument. Namely, it seems 
compatible with the supposed datum that one can coherently ask, “Sure, I epistemically 
ought to believe that p, but ought I really (in the overarching deliberative sense) believe 
that p?” After all, the first part of this question—on a properly nuanced expressivist 
semantics—merely expresses an attitude partially constituted by one’s disposition to rely 
on its being the case that p. This is not incompatible with the further question of whether 
one ought, in some overarching deliberative sense, believe that p. As such, pragmatic 
acceptance seems appropriate for filling out the semantics of epistemic judgments in a 
way that even Hazlett would be unlikely to have problems with.18 
The idea that we sometimes make epistemic evaluations without valuing the 
fundamental organizing value of the epistemic domain is something Hazlett thinks is an 
important datum to capture in our meta-epistemological theorizing. Whether or not he’s 
right about that, it seems expressivism is no less well positioned than convention-
relativism on this score. It might seem as though I am simply affirming Hazlett’s position 
on this issue. I am not. Rather, my point is that expressivism need not be interpreted in 
the way Hazlett does when comparing it with convention-relativism. More specifically, 
on a more plausible way of spelling out the second component of the expressivist’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 We can now put the concern I flagged at the end of Section 2 in the following way. In his discussion of 
expressivism, Hazlett seems to illicitly jump from talk of “acceptance” (2013, p.254) to what I am calling 
the more specific notion of engaged acceptance (2013, p.257).  
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semantics for epistemic discourse, we need not commit the expressivist to a view about 
the normativity of epistemic discourse that Hazlett rejects.19  
5. Conclusion 
Imagine you want to be an anti-realist and you have two ways of doing so. One way 
forces you to deny a very natural-seeming feature of epistemic discourse, and the other 
does not. It seems you should choose the first way. To be sure, there are many other 
respects in which expressivism and convention-relativism could be compared. But the 
point here isn’t to compare expressivism and convention-relativism in a general way. 
Moreover, given that Hazlett argues he’s offering a new and better alternative to the most 
prominent anti-realist view, it seems making further comparisons is his job, not ours. 
While convention-relativism about epistemic discourse is an important contribution to the 
under-explored field of meta-epistemology—one that deserves more attention than it 
currently receives—in the end I’ve argued that Hazlett owes us more of a story about 
why his view is an attractive alternative form of anti-realism. 
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